John Bell Hood: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General Read online

  The first law of the historian is that he shall never dare utter an untruth.

  The second is that he shall suppress nothing that is true.

  Moreover, there shall be no suspicion of partiality in his writing, or of malice.

  — Cicero

  © 2013 By Stephen M. Hood

  All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

  retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,

  photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the

  publisher.

  Hood, Stephen M.

  John Bell Hood: the Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General /

  Stephen M. Hood. — First edition.

  pages cm

  Includes bibliographical references and index.

  EPUB ISBN 978-1-61121-140-5

  PRINT ISBN 978-1-61121-141-2

  1. Hood, John Bell, 1831-1879. 2. Generals—Confederate States of America—

  Biography. 3. United States—History—Civil War, 1861-1865—Biography. 4. United

  States—History—Civil War, 1861-1865—Campaigns. I. Title.

  E467.1.H58H66 2013

  355.0092—dc23

  [B]

  2013010919

  First edition, first printing

  Published by

  Savas Beatie LLC

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  Phone: 916-941-6896

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  Printed in the United States of America.

  To General John Bell and Anna Hood and their descendants, living and dead, who, with dignity and grace, endured so much, for so long.

  General John Bell Hood in a previously unpublished photograph, circa Richmond early 1864, before he left to command a corps in the Army of Tennessee.

  John Bell Hood Personal Papers

  Table of Contents

  Preface

  by Stephen Davis

  Foreword

  by Thomas J. Brown

  Introduction

  Chapter 1

  John Bell Hood: The Son and the Soldier

  Chapter 2

  Robert E. Lee’s Opinion of John Bell Hood

  Chapter 3

  Jeff Davis, Joe Johnston, and John Bell Hood

  Chapter 4

  The Cassville Controversy

  Chapter 5

  The Battles for Atlanta: Hood Fights

  Chapter 6

  Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Tennessee Campaign

  Chapter 7

  John Bell Hood: Feeding and Supplying His Army

  Chapter 8

  Frank Cheatham and the Spring Hill Affair

  Chapter 9

  John Bell Hood and the Battle of Franklin

  Chapter 10

  The Death of Cleburne: Resentment or Remorse?

  Chapter 11

  John Bell Hood and the Battle of Nashville

  Chapter 12

  The Army of Tennessee: Destroyed in Tennessee?

  Chapter 13

  Did John Bell Hood Accuse His Soldiers of Cowardice?

  Chapter 14

  A Callous Attitude: Did John Bell Hood “Bleed His Boys”?

  Chapter 15

  John Bell Hood and Frontal Assaults

  Chapter 16

  Hood to His Men: “Boys, It is All My Fault”

  Chapter 17

  John Bell Hood and Words of Reproach

  Chapter 18

  Words of Praise for John Bell Hood

  Chapter 19

  John Bell Hood: Laudanum, Legends, and Lore

  Afterword

  by Eric Jacobson

  Appendix 1

  Excerpt from Advance and Retreat

  Appendix 2

  “An Eloquent Tribute to the Memory of the Late Gen. J. B. Hood”

  Appendix 3

  Jefferson Davis on Joe Johnston: Excerpt to the Confederate Congress

  Bibliography

  Index

  Maps and photos have been placed throughout the book for the convenience of the reader.

  Preface

  The time is right for Sam Hood’s book. Another way of looking at it is, my, what we have learned since the Civil War’s Centennial fifty years ago.

  No, I’m not thinking about Clive Cussler’s discovery of the wreck of the Confederate submarine H.L. Hunley in 1995. Nor David Blight’s discovery, in the Harvard University archives, of African-Americans’ first decoration day in May 1865 for deceased Union POWs at Charleston’s Race Course prison, which he announced in Race and Reunion (2001).

  I’m thinking about the realization that in the last fifty years Confederate General John Bell Hood deserves a better shake by Clio, our Greek muse of history. Every now and then a major figure of the past merits a re-examination and fresh appraisal by the writers of history. That’s because historiography— the very act of writing history—takes on trends built by previous writers, and even the most conscientious practitioners of the art may absorb ideas and opinions expressed in earlier books and monographs. Such has been the shifting historiography of General Hood.

  There is no disagreement over the first half of Hood’s Confederate war record in Virginia, where he rose from first lieutenant to major general. At the time of his severe wounding at Gettysburg, Hood was widely regarded as one of Lee’s best division commanders. Wounded again at Chickamauga, with his right leg amputated, Hood was lionized in Southern society. At the request of General Longstreet and Secretary Seddon, and with President Davis’ warm approval, Hood was promoted to lieutenant general.

  It was when Hood became a corps commander in the Army of Tennessee, in early 1864, that historians began to differ over his merits as Confederate general. When he was promoted to temporary rank of general and placed in charge of the Army of Tennessee, Southerners at the time and students of the war since have quarreled about Hood’s qualification for this huge responsibility. The loss of Atlanta, the disastrous repulse at Franklin and humiliating rout at Nashville created such a tragic record of failure that critics of Hood have virtually taunted Jeff Davis with “we told you so.”

  Sam Hood addresses this trendy literature here, commendably pointing out “factual errors, inaccurate and misleading paraphrasing of primary sources, and apparent concealment of historical facts.” On the other hand, in the past few decades there has appeared at least a small bookshelf which might be called “Hood’s scholarly rehabilitation/work in progress.”

  Whether Sam’s keen eye and sharper pen lead to a better shake for Hood at the bar of history will be anyone’s guess. For now, I invite you to join Sam in taking a fresh look at John Bell’s Hood historical record.

  You’re in for a fine read.

  Stephen Davis

  Atlanta, Spring 2013

  Foreword

  John Bell Hood and the Lost Cause

  The path to the destruction of John Bell Hood’s historical memory began with his official report, submitted to Richmond a few months before th
e end of the war in February of 1865. In particular, Hood in his report sharply criticized Joseph Johnston’s battlefield conduct, claiming it led to great waste in men and material along with a gradual demoralization of the troops. Johnston’s consistent policy of strategic withdrawal in the face of the enemy, with its vain hope of luring Sherman into a trap, had worn the men down, Hood believed.

  Hood declared that he “was placed in command under the most trying [of] circumstances”1 and went on to state that “the army was enfeebled in number and in spirit by a long retreat and severe and apparently fruitless losses.”2 Here “fruitless” refers to Johnston’s seeming reluctance to fight a decisive battle or to defend Atlanta. By engaging in a Fabian strategy of a fighting withdrawal, Johnston had given up more than one hundred miles of territory, and by finally crossing the Chattahoochee River he had sacrificed the last natural barrier between Georgia’s capital and the enemy. Hood also noted that during Johnston’s tenure the army “had dwindled day by day in partial engagements and skirmishes.”3

  Some of Hood’s comments are open to debate. For example, Johnston undoubtedly fought battles. The distinction, later made by Hood in his memoirs, however, is that Johnston failed to fight a general battle. Writing in the aftermath of his promotion and ascension to command of the Army of Tennessee and its total defeat at Nashville, Hood may well have felt bitter about being placed in such a tenuous position and, by February 1865, with the Confederacy on the threshold of its demise, perhaps regretted that he had accepted the job. His report elicited a threat of legal action from Johnston, and more importantly it motivated the proud Virginian to begin writing his own memoirs. Historian Brian Miller writes that this event “serves as the onset of Hood’s postwar memory construction.”4 Johnston attacked Hood in his postwar memoirs. When Hood wrote to defend himself, however, Lost Cause Johnston supporters (such as former generals Cadmus Wilcox and James Chalmers) joined in with negative comments of their own.

  Hood fought this battle mostly alone, as few chose to risk their own reputations by going up against the Southern Historical Society writers, based in Richmond after its move from New Orleans.

  Immediately following the war, Hood moved to Louisiana and settled in New Orleans, where he began building himself a place in the postwar world. He concentrated on business and charitable works involving wounded veterans, widows, and orphans funds. He also took an active part in early efforts by the Southern Historical Society, established in the Louisiana capital, to help the South come to terms with its heavy losses, serving most notably as vice president of the Lee Monument Association in 1870. Hood also reestablished a connection with his former famous command, the Texas brigade, attending its first reunion held in Houston in 1872. In sum, by involving himself with public works and acting as a constructive citizen, he rebuilt feelings of self-worth shattered by the war and established a positive reputation for himself in New Orleans.5

  Hood responded to critical content in Johnston’s memoirs and quickly began work on his own. Miller writes that Johnston “made Hood the scapegoat, ridiculed his military actions, and deflected any possible blame for his own failure at Atlanta.”6 Johnston’s writings proved dry and overly technical and did not sell well. The work had critics, including a reviewer for the New Orleans Daily Picayune, who observed, “There are hyenas in human form who stand ready to tear open the grave of the buried past and whet their insatiable appetites for revenge upon the slain heroes … and spit their venom on those who survive.”7 Had Hood been able to step back, ignore Johnston’s ill-selling memoirs, and continue his charitable works, the controversy may well have died, but the Kentuckian was unable to ignore what he considered to be an attack on his honor.

  A profound shift in the construction of Civil War history occurred when the Southern Historical Society relocated to Richmond, Virginia, in 1873, where Southern nationalists from the Old Dominion, led by Jubal Early, built upon romanticized Lost Cause ideology and aimed to re-create the Old South. Most importantly for Hood, Early’s group sought whipping boys for defeat. Residents of New Orleans complained that their historical society had been hijacked, and could have further claimed that the newly managed Southern Historical Society failed to represent the entire South.

  Early’s Virginians elevated themselves and their own state. Virginius Dabney, a well-known author and journalist of the day crowed: “We Virginians modestly admit our superiority to citizens of all other American states.”8 Historian Thomas Connelly, a Tennessean, wrote that Lost Cause architects “sought the best of both worlds—to be sorrowful, reluctant lovers of the Union who were dragged into the secessionist camp.”9

  The Virginia coalition used the Lost Cause to ease the region through hard times by memorializing the Southern war effort. Among its central tenets, the battle of Gettysburg became the crucial turning point of the war; the “high water mark of the Confederacy.” Southerners argued that the Confederacy succumbed because it ran up against not superior civilization and military strength but to overwhelming numbers and an unfair industrial advantage. Convenient villains such as “Lee’s old war horse,” James Longstreet, and John Bell Hood shared blame for the loss in Pennsylvania.10

  Hood was assessed partial blame for Gettysburg, but more significantly, also for the Confederate defeat in the West, with the battle of Franklin symbolic of his overall failed performance.11

  “Old Jube” Early and his Virginia cohorts controlled virtually all of the South’s literary output from 1865 to 1876, the period historically known as Reconstruction. The most important Lost Cause organ consisted of a large collection of articles and writings that came to be known as The Southern Historical Society Papers, but other publications including Confederate Veteran, Our Living and Our Dead, and Southern Bivouac also played important roles in reconstructing the history of the war. In these periodicals, Southern authors exerted herculean effort in an attempt to explain the crushing defeat they had suffered in the Civil War. Since Virginians largely controlled the information apparatus, a complimentary national stereotype emerged featuring a “moonlight and magnolias” interpretation of plantation society with gallant cavaliers galloping across the landscape, breathless belles anxiously awaiting their return, and happy and contented slaves praising their master’s generosity.12

  Lost Cause writers transformed Robert E. Lee from a dependable and inspirational military leader into a Confederate deity symbolic of Southern virtue. They made it possible for him to evolve from a Southern hero to inclusion within the national pantheon of military leaders where he could stand among such legendary figures as George Washington and Andrew Jackson. Through skillful manipulation “Marse Robert,” who had been modest in life, became all that glittered in Southern chivalry after death. This process reached completion with the unveiling of a massive statue of Lee in Richmond on May 29, 1890.

  Lost Cause artists possessed the power to enhance reputations and to wreck them.13 Casting about for support and eager to castigate Hood for his actions, Joe Johnston sought out a loyal former subordinate, Benjamin Franklin Cheatham.

  Cheatham, who had named his son after Johnston, expressed willingness to help in this new campaign. Perhaps he should not have been so willing to assist in denigrating Hood. After all, Hood had the opportunity to remove him from command following Spring Hill and Franklin but had held back. On December 8 and 9, 1864, Hood wrote to Secretary of War James Seddon concerning Cheatham, a corps commander under Hood. His first message withdrew an earlier recommendation that Cheatham be promoted, while the second requested someone to replace him in command. In a third communication, however, he withdrew the removal, stating that though Cheatham had made mistakes, he felt he could learn from them and should remain in command of his troops.

  In the immediate wake of events in Tennessee, Cheatham should have understood his mistakes and realized that others did as well. In the postwar years, especially with Lost Cause advocates seeking scapegoats, Cheatham may have calculated in supporting Johnston, the Virginia
n, over Hood, the Kentuckian. After all, the Old Dominion coalition had momentum on its side and must have looked like a winning combination. In heaping blame on men such as Longstreet and Hood in far-away Louisiana, Cheatham, Johnston, Early, and others could exorcise their own demons, transferring their own failings onto others.14

  Hood’s memoirs Advance and Retreat, published a year after his untimely death in 1879, directly contradicted the creators of the Lost Cause myth, which sought to glorify certain ex-Confederates (mostly Virginians like Generals Lee and Johnston) and vilify men like Generals Longstreet and Hood. In other words, Hood’s accounting did not fit “within the collective memory being constructed across the South.”15 Though he would have preferred to leave his story to the “unbiased historians of the future,” Hood believed that those writers would be unable to do him justice as Johnston had already prejudiced his case.16

  Hood listed the reasons for the failure in Tennessee: “The unfortunate affair at Spring Hill, the short duration of daylight at Franklin,” and the lack of Trans-Mississippi cooperation from Kirby Smith.17 Hood also offered a harsh assessment of his predecessor, asking, “Since [Johnston] fought not a single general battle during the entire war of Secession, what just claim has he to generalship?” He further insisted that “had General Johnston possessed the requisite spirit and boldness to seize … various chances for victory, which were offered to him, he never would have allowed … Sherman to push him back one hundred miles in sixty-six days, into the very heart of the Confederacy.”18 Brian Miller concluded that though Hood “was not perfect, he certainly was no Joe Johnston.”19